The annual Buyer's Guide as printed in the KITPLANES magazine.

Which brings us to a question of form. For several years we have been examining new approaches to presenting this information in the most useful and valuable manner. With the growth of the Internet over the last 15 years, more and more people are consuming media in new ways, from how we get news to how we listen to music to how and when we watch movies or television. So it stands to reason that we would seek to enhance the online version of the Buyer’s Guide, paired with a differently conceived counterpart in the magazine that highlights changes, new designs and trends. A dynamic version of online data, given a suitable platform and support, would yield much more useful search results and allow us to update the information as it becomes available rather than just once a year. The problem is that any database structure created years ago is bound to outgrow its original purpose, and we’ve been working around those inherited limitations ever since.

The reasons for considering such changes are clear. Most manufacturers have an informational web site where potential buyers can read to their heart’s content about a design of their choice. Also, changing the format in the magazine would allow us to call attention to what is noteworthy, and to group statistics and profiles in a meaningful way, with more flexibility to tailor the presentation of the material to the material being presented.

As it stands now, our data presentation in the magazine is impractically constrictive: one design, one listing, giving the appearance that all designs are created equal. In some ways, this is misleading. Each kit gets equivalent attention, whether the company has sold 500 kits or five over the past decade. One must really dig to get the details. There’s no room to call attention to new designs, or those with new features or significant updates. Nor can we group various designs in a way that makes sense to buyers. Yet, as a monthly magazine, providing analysis and context is part of our core mission. Presenting the data in a different format in the magazine, supplemented by improved data online (in a reasonable and accessible form), would allow us to point out some of the disparities and contrasts. This is not to say that each viable company should not be included in a comprehensive Buyer’s Guide, but rather in what form?

So, we would like to hear from you, the readers we serve. How can we make the Buyer’s Guides more valuable to you? I’ve heard opinions across the spectrum, one subscriber (a current builder) saying that when he used to pick up the magazine on the newsstand, he’d put the Buyer’s Guides back because they were of no interest to him. Other readers have argued vehemently that the Buyer’s Guides are some of their favorite issues, and they don’t want to be forced to go online to look for more information. Where do you stand?

Again, our intention is not to do away with the Buyer’s Guides, but merely to leverage the current technology and various platforms available to us to improve the presentation of information. Change is inevitable. (I recently heard someone say that if Shakespeare were writing today, he wouldn’t use a quill.) A clean, web-based data set would provide myriad options. For example, say that you conducted a search for a given type of aircraft, and the result included four designs that fit your criteria. Given the large amount of archival material on our web site, we could link to past flight reviews or perhaps a related video. We could add links to manufacturer web sites, making it easy to access their information from a search result (and see how it differs). The possibilities are endless, and the value of current information available year-round cannot be overestimated for serious buyers.

That’s our perspective. We’d like to hear from you—both the vocal minority and the seemingly silent majority alike. Let us know what you think.

There wasn’t much to it. Take out the old valve with a deep socket. Use Teflon tape on the new parts, making sure that the tightening of the pieces tightens the tape, too. And don’t over-tighten. The new pressure relief valve has a wrench fitting, but the instructions say finger-tighten only. Make sure that the drain valve is protected by the wheels or the tank so that it doesn’t get hit accidentally.

Jeffrey "Mossy" Moss, 2010 U.S. National Flight Instructor of the Year, specializes in training in TAA.

“It’s an issue of training,” says Jeffrey “Mossy” Moss, the U.S. 2010 National Flight Instructor of the Year, who specializes in flight instruction for TAA. “Face it, without proper training, I mean more than just being able to hit the direct-to button, these aircraft can be dangerous. They fly high, they fly fast, and their  owner-operators  may be more likely to fly into conditions where weather can be a factor. It takes airline-style discipline and some detail-oriented training by someone who really knows the hardware and software of the EFIS to allow the pilot to fully utilize the power of the digital instrumentation. And if you want to be safe, you need to be able to fully use these tools,” he says.

It’s true. My own experience with flight-training clients of all ilk who have installed sophisticated GPS, EFISes and autopilots in their newly built aircraft is that they get far too involved in figuring out, say, how to push the buttons to get the autopilot engaged to fly the flight plan or a coupled approach, to the detriment of flying the aircraft. That’s not good. Another issue is people who become so good at letting the autopilot and boxes fly the airplane that they are unable to cope when the boxes malfunction. Both situations are dangerous.

I know. My RV-10 is equipped with Grand Rapids Technologies Horizon EFIS I boxes, a TruTrak autopilot and a Garmin GNC300XL GPS. After learning how many keystrokes it would take to get the autopilot to fly a coupled approach, I decided it was far simpler to use the “track” mode and hand-fly the airplane to intercept and fly the approach, using the standard localizer cues. I do like the virtual “fly-the-boxes” synthetic approach program, and find that series of button-pushing considerably less onerous – if I’ve been practicing. But practicing means studying the manual a bit before every flight because I don’t get to fly every day. There is no software simulation I can practice with on my computer. The hardware manufacturer doesn’t offer it.

So, how do we fix the statistics? I agree with Mossy that we need to keep training, and on that note, we need to demand better training materials from EFIS, autopilot and GPS manufacturers, particularly computer-based simulators to augment that training. I want the next safety study to show that the newest and the most reliable in-flight instrumentation makes every phase of flight safer.

Epic LT. (Photo: Epic Aircraft.)

The winding road traveled by Epic Aircraft rounded what could be the last bend today. On Wednesday, April 7, the bankruptcy judge received a proposal that would, in essence, put a consortium of Epic LT builders in the driver’s seat. In the agreement, China Aviation, an aerospace concern owned by the Chinese government, will be allowed to develop the Epic aircraft for sale outside of North America. According to a report in The Oregonian, China Aviation and the LT Builders Group will pay $4.3 million for the assets of the collapsed company.

The lead creditor in the proceeding is quoted as calling the agreement, “an ideal cross between a shotgun wedding and a Mexican standoff.” Federal judge Randall Dunn told China Aviation and LT Builders Group this week that if they couldn’t come to an agreement, he would award the assets to a third party, Harlow Aerostructures. While the judge has received the new agreement between LT Builders Group and China Aviation, he still must approve the deal.

It’s clear that the judge was attempting to diminish the damage done to the owners of 15 partially completed “kit” aircraft who had slapped down as much a $1.5 million to “build” their own pressurized turboprops. China Aviation, for its part, admitted that the desire is to take aircraft (the Epic LT turboprop and the Elite twinjet) back to China to jumpstart the country’s aero industry.

Forget for a moment that Epic tried to get the LT certified here and in Canada, without success, leaving you to wonder if the stumbling block was something in the design, lack of money, or both. In many ways, that’s a shame: The LT would slot in nicely above the TBM-700/850 and Piper Meridian but below the mammoth Pilatus PC-12—fertile ground for a fast, theoretically capable turboprop single in a business role.

Under the new agreement, it appears that both will be satisfied, though at the moment it remains unclear how the new Epic will manage production at Bend. With the reworking of the rules that govern Experimental/Amateur-Built aircraft last year, new requirements are in place to denote how much commercial assistance is used, and that amount is taken away from the percentage the builder is allowed to claim toward the majority of work. If the builders complete their aircraft in a way that truly meets the letter of the rules, the process will be long and difficult.

The Epic "factory" in Bend, Oregon. (Photo: Epic Aircraft.)

It has seldom been voiced but was widely understood in the industry that the Epic “homebuilt” program was the very thing that set the FAA into looking at abuses in the Experimental world and caused more than 18 months of heartburn, long meetings, builder angst and kit-manufacturer concern. As initially proposed to builders The idea that you could spend “a few weeks” helping to construct your pressurized, turboprop, retractable-gear single and still get credit for doing the “majority” of the work was laughable, but somehow Epic managed to get a local DAR or the FAA to initially buy into the idea, and sign off the Bend-built LTs as Experimental/Amateur-Built aircraft.

Moreover, there was no option to take the kit out of the factory and build independently. While hired-gun builders popular in the 1980s and 1990s kept a low profile, Epic was absolutely in-your-face with its process. In fact, documents that followed the collapse of Epic (and its many shell companies) disclosed that at least some builders were required to appoint a build manager to oversee the project at the factory, and that manager was to be an employee of Epic.

The legal documents released last summer also painted a picture of “creative” business practices, and one creditor is quoted as saying the original Epic program and its intertwined subsidiaries amounted to a Ponzi scheme.

UPDATE: Where do we go from here? According to Douglas King, the new group intends to resume kit production and builder assistance in Bend. I spoke with King on Thursday afternoon and he said that, “We intend to run it honest and straight, according to the law, be good neighbors here in Bend. We’re going to do what we say…and not over promise. We are going to work really hard at producing high-quality airplanes.”

King defended the in-house build process and laid the lion’s share of the blame for misunderstandings within the industry at the feet of former Epic boss Rick Schramek. “We all spent a lot more time building than we were led to believe,” he said, indicating that he has spent more than 12 weeks at the Bend facility and still has not installed the engine, avionics, or interior. If there was friction between industry members and Epic it wasn’t the “excellent employees” who worked in Bend or the builders, “It was Schramek,” he said.

In continuing to build kits, King said that “we’re going to follow the intent and letter of the law. We’re going to quietly move on and let builders finish their airplanes.” He indicated that the new program won’t be as large as Epic was at its height. “We aren’t going to hire as many people,” King said. “The economy is too hard for that.” But, he said, the LT Builders Group would forge ahead.

The effort won’t be without challenges. King said that this commentary could well cast a spotlight on the situation, but I’m certain that however this new program goes forward it will be closely scrutinized. I also suspect that much work remains to get the LT through certification—presuming that the goal is to certify the design and build them for North American consumption at the Bend facility in addition to supporting the kit effort. Or China Aviation could promise to help the remaining builders finish their LTs while packing the intellectual property and tooling for a long boat ride across the Pacific. It’s too soon to know.

Photo courtesy FlightAware.com.

In the specialist press, the pilot was celebrated for keeping the airplane under control and putting the Lancair onto the Hilton Head beach instead of into a parking lot—potentially injuring many more souls—or into the ocean, which might have had dire consequences for him and his passenger. We pilots realized just how challenging such a situation can be: little to no forward visibility in an airplane that descends quickly and lands fast, and no power at all to help moderate the descent.

It was a different story in the mainstream press, whose merchants of hipshot derided the pilot for not seeing the runner and for callously choosing this stretch of beach, which, according to reports, was not at all crowded. His desire to save his airplane overrode what should have been a greater desire to spare the lives of others, or so you’d think from reading the general-media accounts. And in the stories I’ve read where reader feedback was supported, there were many examples of general outrage. Again, the pilot should have put the airplane into the ocean, and, so it would seem, sacrifice his own and his passenger’s life to avoid what can only be considered a freak occurrence.

Reporters look for sources and found one ready made in Mary Schiavo, former inspector general of the National Transportation Safety Board. She is reported to have commented that “even with oil smeared on the windshield…[the pilot] should have been able to see through a small window on the side of the plane and possibly yell out to anyone below.” If only the pressurized Lancair had one…

After the shock of an airplane hitting an innocent jogger began to subside, the usual questions about safety began to percolate to the surface. Let’s put something to rest right away: As far as I can discern, the engine and prop on the accident airplane were certified items. What appears to have been a crankshaft failure might well have happened, and indeed has happened, to a Piper Malibu. Without more information, it’s difficult to separate the engine failure from the fact that it happened to be in an Experimental/Amateur-Built aircraft, but that’s too fine a distinction for the general media.

Instead, the press began looking for sources to understand the homebuilt safety record. Unfortunately, it found the recently published Nall Report, put out by the AOPA Air Safety Foundation based on NTSB data. In fairly a churlish tone, the Nall Report says:

Amateur-built aircraft continued to suffer dramatically higher accident rates than type-certificated aircraft due, in part, to greater numbers of mechanical failures and unexplained losses of engine power.

In 2008, 228 amateur-built fixed-wing aircraft were involved in 226 distinct accidents, the same numbers as in 2007… This represents 18% of all non-commercial fixed-wing accident aircraft, the highest proportion in the past ten years, during which time that proportion has steadily increased. Sixty-one of these were fatal, resulting in 82 deaths; these were increases of six fatal accidents and nine fatalities from the previous year, and made up 26% of fatal accidents and 19% of all fatalities. By comparison, amateur-built aircraft logged less than 5% of the corresponding flight time. 2008 saw the highest numbers of fatal accidents and individual fatalities in the past decade, and more total accidents than any year except 2007. The 27% lethality rate in these accidents was 10 full percentage points higher than that for accidents in type-certificated airplanes.

Fairly sobering numbers—if they’re correct.

Turns out they’re not. I spent a few hours with the raw data and by simply recognizing which aircraft were not actually Experimental/Amateur-Built designs, found that the true count was 53 fatal accidents taking 72 lives. Now, that’s still more than any of us would like it to be, but the point is that the NTSB records are rife with errors. Some aircraft listed as homebuilts, in fact weren’t: There was a Kaman helicopter and a Laird biplane in the mix. What’s more, the recent changes in registration rules for ultralights have added a number of designs now called ELSAs that were lumped in with homebuilts, further skewing the data. There were basic arithmetic errors, crediting one accident involving two aircraft and three fatalities as having three deaths each. In truth, sloppy record keeping isn’t new, but the fact is that this latest round of reports has caused this shabby data set to be used against us.

Aviation writer and statistic keeper Ron Wanttaja found similar errors over the years and additional errors in the 2008 data; his detailed look at the data reduced the total number of accidents for homebuilts to 185, a deletion of 84 accidents that did not involve homebuilts. What’s more, Wanttaja advocates counting accidents against fleet size instead of the more popular hours-flown denominator because this is a figure more easily discerned. In his analysis, the original accident rate by fleet size as published in the Nall Report was 0.86% in 2008, while the much more accurate assessment has the number at 0.59%. The result is that the homebuilt rate by fleet size is just less than 20% higher than for certified aircraft, rather than the 72% higher as claimed by the Nall Report.

Trying to determine an accident rate per hours flown is complicated by the error-ridden accident data on one side of the equation and the nature of hours-flown data collection, which is a combination of voluntary pilot surveys and educated guesswork on the other. Moreover, it’s common to see data sets that contradict. The FAA data used in the Nall Report implies that fewer homebuilts were flying in 2008 as part of an overall slowing of the GA fleet’s hours-flown figure. This in turn raises  the accident rate for a given number of accidents. But the agency’s own outlook shows Experimental/Amateur-Built aircraft as one of the very few segments expected to grow in the next 10 to 15 years, and it’s my perception that the activity level of homebuilts is at least steady with regard to the rest of the fleet. (I’ll confess this is a purely unscientific survey, so I won’t put hard numbers to it.)

So the most recent event has the FAA publishing an “InFO” Information for Operators document citing “Safety concerns of amateur-built experimental Lancair and other amateur built airplanes possessing high wing loading and stall speeds in excess of 61 knots…” Dated March 9, the report was not released until the third week in March. The report goes on to say that, “FAA analysis of fatal accidents for airplanes operating under an experimental airworthiness certificates, such as the Lancair, has revealed a large and disproportionate number of fatal accidents for their fleet size. Though the FAA has seen a recent downward trend, these aircraft types have experienced fatal accident rates substantially higher than for-personal-use general aviation and the overall fatal accident rate for all amateur-built experimental aircraft.” Hold on. Didn’t the NTSB and AOPA just say the homebuilt fatality rate was up? And just what defines “a large and disproportionate number of fatal accidents”? Can we have some accurate data, placed in context, please? We need more than a vague sensation that something’s amiss, and, before making recommendations, understand the root causes of the accidents that form this impression. Wing loading and stall speeds are easy targets because they’re lines on the spec sheet, but the truth is more subtle. Fast airplanes can be safe, and even slow-stalling aircraft with low wing loading can be a handful. (Early experience with SLSAs demonstrated that a pilot with 2000 hours in a Bonanza might not safely transition into an LSA without explicit instruction.)

In addition, it sure seems as though Lancair is getting to ride the barrel down the falls here. There are other designs with high wing loading and with stall speeds at or above 61 knots but only Lancair was specifically referred to. Could it be that the Lancairs are the most visible examples?

In the InFO document, the FAA made several recommendations. Among them, installation of angle-of-attack devices or stall warnings; use of mechanics with specific-model experience to evaluate rigging, wing alignment and weight and balance; evaluation by a qualified test pilot for handling qualities, particularly after aerodynamic modifications are performed; and specific training for the pilot. At least in the Lancair world, most of these recommendations are already being followed—there are effective, demanding training programs for the Lancair IV to ensure pilots are comfortable with the airplane’s handling qualities and required airspeeds.

If the past is prologue, my worry is that the next act will be a move by the FAA to set standards for Experimental/Amateur-Built aircraft for specs such as maximum wing loading and stall speeds. We enjoy incredible freedom in this area, but the chain of events strikes me as table setting for regulations that, for the first time, would impede the ability of designers and experimenters to pursue new technologies and aerodynamics. And we all know that once a few regulations are imposed, follow-ons come much more easily. What might be next? Demand certified engines and props? TSO-approved avionics? (Ironically, there’s a good chance the Lancair at the start of this story had all of the above.)

I  hope the Experimental Aircraft Association will begin to make more noise on this front, certainly much more than the meekly worded rebuttal to the Nall Report’s use of suspect NTSB data and acknowledgment of the FAA InFO letter. I don’t doubt there are politics in the background, but, personally, I feel under-represented.

This is a line-in-the-sand moment.

If the FAA is intent on forcing rules through in the guise of improving safety, it’s critical that we all call attention to sloppy, biased reporting and accident data riddled with errors before it constitutes the rationale for revised policy or increased regulation.

On that note, we’ve decided to do something about this dissemination of bad data. Starting in the July issue of KITPLANES and thanks to the considerable efforts of Ron Wanttaja, we’ll begin looking into certain aircraft types and the accidents common to them. First, we’ll examine the two-seat Van’s RV series, and then have a detailed review of the Lancair accidents in the August issue. It’s my hope that proper and accurate accident analysis will reveal that our sport can mix freedom of design and execution, and safety. I suspect that once we’ve stripped away the stupid pilot tricks and ill-considered modifications to established kits, the accident picture of homebuilts and store-bought airplanes will be remarkably similar.

Spring has sprung, and airshow season is upon us. Even if you can’t make Sun ‘n Fun this year, follow all the action on our updated news section on kitplanes.com. Called Newsline, our fresh approach to current events will bring you right into all the major events this year with breaking news, video feeds, and informed commentary. Easier on the eyes and easier to navigate, Newsline also provides an opportunity for reader feedback. Check it out today.

There is a long tradition of under-wing camping at Oshkosh, regardless of weather.

It occurs to me that there are two Oshkosh rain modes. The first kicks in when rain erupts with a certain amount of warning after a beautiful airshow day, one that began with no hint of precipitation. The midday rain crowd shifts into indoor exhibits, huddles under wings and sprouts ponchos, and even stays for the Doobie Brothers concert on Monday evening.

And then there’s the Wet Beginning mode, when dedicated Oshkoshers wake up with rain already falling, but head out into the show grounds anyway. Many, of course, are homeless vagrants residing in the campgrounds, already damp from their makeshift accommodations. We’re here, we’re without fear, and we will not be denied. Heck, it might clear up later…

Dick Knapinski, EAA’s ever-ebullient media spokesman, announced at his briefing Thursday morning that “full dust-control measures are in effect today,” as a steady drizzle poured off the roof. The diminished crowd of hard-core attendees went into buildings to shop under cover, and many of the day’s events were shifted to dry alternatives. The yearly “Meet the Administrator” gathering with the FAA’s new chief, Captain Randy Babbitt, was already set up at noon for the Honda forum building. Showers persisted until mid-afternoon, moving out in time for the usual white-puffy airshow skies.

Calling all early adopters... Photo: Terrafugia.

I must confess to being torn between twin folding-wing temptations. Should I get on the Early Adopter list for the Terrafugia roadable airplane or the Icon A5 amphibious LSA? In the presence of the respective pitchmen, I can almost be persuaded. However, a third dilemma now presents itself in the form of a proposed flying trike-motorcycle, the Sampson Motors Switchblade. Only jaded Oshkosh temperament stiffens my resolve. If you prefer to carry your motorcycle rather than fly it, the folks at MotoPod have devised a belly pod for the Vans RV-10 that accommodates a modified 225cc Suzuki with the front wheel detached and handlebars folded. Approvals are being sought for certified aircraft.

The sleek Sampson Switchblade.

I discovered many other opportunities in the making around the show. Over in front of Hangar D, there’s an interesting Russian twin-Rotax amphibian being promoted with halting English, only from brochures at this point, though it is flying. The four-seat Samara (from its city of origin) has a turtledeck hatch and a walkway between its twin tails to facilitate dry-footed egress when backed onto the beach.

The adjacent E-7 Bush Hog, on the other hand, was available for inspection in flying form, a big seven-seat single powered by an IO-720 Lycoming, or alternatively a small turbine. It resembles a scaled-down Cessna Caravan, with its rugged maingear cushioned by low-maintenance rubber biscuits.

The Icon A5 has made a splash.

Most fascinating was the one-off Grumman Widgeon look-alike over by the old Brown Arch flight-line gate, from a distance resembling the Franklin-conversion of the old G44. Instead, it’s an all new slick composite airframe called the Ellison-Mahon Gweduck, powered by a pair of 300-hp IO-540 Lycomings. Jet Blue Airline shared Aeroshell Square with the Airbus A380, landing its one-and-only Blackberry A320 at mid-morning, dubbed the Beta Blue airplane. Hardcore in-touch devotees can log on in flight (above 10,000 feet) with appropriate equipment. The old Type-Club tent at the Vintage Aircraft Red Barn is no more; in its place is a fine new Vintage Hangar, where the affinity groups for each of the older designs can meet under hard cover. The big attraction this year was the only surviving PA-18 Pitcairn autogiro (I know, that’s the way they spelled it), reconstructed from a basket of parts to flying status. It was parked in the antique area in all its fresh glory. In the North exhibit area, the Olde Oshkosh row still favored by many veteran exhibitors, Sonex Aircraft was displaying a Sonex that sported miniature turbojet engines mounted between its V-tails. Not yet flying, it gets attention and threatens to lower the entry bar for the VLJ marketplace. A finer day for strolling the Oshkosh line could not be imagined.