The FAA Production and Airworthiness Division (AIR-200) will have the Kitfox kit added to the List of Amateur-Built Aircraft Kits located on the FAA web site.

Kitfox Aircraft uses CNC routers, and the standard airframe kit and control system parts are supplied completely welded and with all the hardware and covering system needed to complete the airframe.

The Kitfox Series 7 Super Sport is the latest model of the Kitfox that was introduced in 1984. This newest model has a maximum gross weight capability of 1550 pounds and can still be operated as an LSA if desired. It retains the ability to fold the wings quickly and easily and offers larger, wider cabin area with more head and leg room plus a baggage area capable of carrying up to 150 pounds. Builders also have the option to change the gear position from taildragger to trigear at any time if desired. The Series 7 can be powered with engines from the Rotax 9 series, Continental O-200, IO-240, Lycoming O-235, O-233, Jabiru 3300 and Rotec R2800 Radial. Many builders are also utilizing other choices from UL Power, Corvair and Viking Honda.

For more information, call 208/337-1511 or visit www.kitfoxaircraft.com. Kitfox is also at EAA AirVenture, in the North Display area, Booths 634 and 635.

To read Mary Grady’s entire report, click here.

- Detailed methods for determining the location of the empty-weight center of gravity (CG) of an aircraft

- Information for A&P mechanics to determine the weight and CG changes caused by repairs or alterations

- Instructions for conducting adverse-loaded CG checks and the best way to figure the amount and location of ballast needed to bring CG within allowable limits

- Loading computations for general aviation aircraft

- Unique requirements for helicopter weight and balance control

-Examples for solving weight and balance problems using calculators, E6-B flight computers, and a dedicated flight computer

With a complete glossary and clear charts and mathematical formulas, the Aircraft Weight and Balance Handbook should be helpful for any pilot. The price is $9.95.

For more information, call Nina Boutsikaris at 212/643-6816, x233 or email nboutsikaris@skyhorsepublishing.com

Aircraft Weight and Balance Handbook

FAA-H-8083-1A

On Sale: January 30, 2011

ISBN: 978-1-61608-124-9

Skyhorse Publishing, Inc.

307 West 36th Street, 11th Floor

New York, NY 10018

www.skyhorsepublishing.com

The Super 18 is based on the venerable Piper Super Cub and features Dakota Cub renowned slotted wing technology as well as other refinements. Dakota Cub Super 18s feature a majority of FAA-PMAd parts, the same parts used in the construction of the Part 23-certified Super 18-180.

The Super 18-160-EXP is designed for the Lycoming O-320 and can be equipped with a variety of propellers, including the MT composite constant-speed prop. The kit features a wide-body fuselage that is 4 inches wider than a standard Piper PA-18 Super Cub fuselage. With more baggage capacity, modern technology and construction, and comfort, the Super 18 is a capable backcountry airplane, the company says.

The Super 18-LT-EXP is an LSA-eligible amateur-built aircraft that features a standard PA-18 fuselage to keep weight down. With an extended baggage compartment and all the upgrades of heavier aircraft, it offers Sport Pilots an airplane that uses PMA’d parts unavailable on other kits. The Super 18-LT-EXP also features Dakota Cub’s slotted wing and 90-inch flaps, giving builders a true backcountry aircraft that is also LSA-compliant. It can be built with a higher gross weight for those who are not Sport Pilots.

Dakota Cub has been building FAA-PMA’d parts for Piper Aircraft for nearly 20 years and is a leader in high-performance modifications for Super Cubs. Extensive experience improving these aircraft for off-field operations drove the design of the Super 18, the company says.

For more information, call 605/757-6628 or visit www.dakotacub.com.

RANGR Transmitter with GPS. The RANGR-E unit will look identical.

FreeFlight Systems has debuted its line of RANGR 978 MHz ADS-B products including ADS-B transmitters, transmitters with WAAS GPS, transceivers and transceivers with WAAS GPS. The final FAA rule dictates that an ADS-B compliant system must have a high integrity position source and a radio that sends specific information from that position source to ATC. The easiest way to achieve this requirement is to pair a TSO-C145/C146 WAAS GPS with an ADS-B approved transmitter. Further, 978 MHz compliance requires a small control head for entering squawk codes.

The RANGR family allows customers the most flexibility by offering complete stand-alone solutions with certified GPS and 978MHz transmitter all-in-one or separate, modular solutions to interface with existing systems in the aircraft.

The FreeFlight TSO RANGR family is designed for certified aircraft; the non-TSO RANGR-E family is designed for Experimental aircraft and includes a transmitter, transmitter with GPS, transceiver and transceiver with GPS. All are designed and tested to meet the final requirements for ADS-B including TSO-C154c for the 978 MHz transmitter and TSO-C145 for the GPS, but will not actually hold a TSO.

For Experimental category aircraft the certification process for ADS-B systems is expected to follow the model of other “for credit” equipment having a safety impact on surrounding aircraft, such as transponders, the company says. The easiest way to receive ADS-B approval and installation approval is to use TSO equipment. However, equipment that meets the minimum standards but does not carry a TSO may suffice because FreeFlight Systems offers TSO units and can therefore legitimately “self certify” that the non-TSO product is identical. In addition to installation approval, this also ensures the integrity of the system and will ensure that the equipped aircraft receives the most accurate, complete and useful ADS-B “in” information. To gain full credit for ADS-B, the customer need only add an approved control head, which is offered as an option, to the 978 MHz transmitter. All RANGR-E systems can be upgraded to full TSO versions.

All of the RANGR products are designed to provide the pilot with all the additional benefits of ADS-B including TIS-B, ADS-R, extended ATC coverage, search and rescue coverage and flight tracking.  In addition, the RANGR family will provide services only offered on 978 MHz including FIS-B, fleet tracking and other future services.

“We believe that our customers want to realize the full safety benefits of ADS-B “Out” along with the value added free traffic and weather services available though ADS-B “In,’” said Tim Taylor, president and CEO of FreeFlight Systems. “To make sure this is true today and for the future, we have made our systems fully compliant with the final ADS-B rules and installation criteria since we know that the FAA will ultimately only provide these services to fully compliant aircraft.”

The RANGR-E products price and availability is:

RANGR-E Transceiver/GPS $3495 Q2, 2011

RANGR-E Transceiver $2495 Q2, 2011

RANGR-E Transmitter/GPS $2995 Q1, 2011

RANGR-E Transmitter $1995 Q4, 2010

RANGR-E  Receiver $1200 Q3, 2010

For more information, visit www.freeflightsystems.com. Free Flight also has a display at Oshkosh/AirVenture (Booth 2157) through August 1.

The August date listed in the AEA Regulatory Update dated June 21 is the absolute earliest date the FCC rule could have become effective. Thanks to the efforts of the AOPA, the AEA and other trade associations, the final rule has not been submitted to the Federal Register for publication; therefore, the 60-day clock for implementation of the rule has not begun. There is no way of knowing if or when this rule will become final.

Further, the FCC has clarified that the rule is targeting legacy TSO C91a type ELTs, which operate primarily on 121.5 MHz, not the general use of frequency 121.5 MHz as the rule implies. Current TSO C126 ELTs are not affected by this ruling.

The AEA encourages its membership not to sell C91a ELTs to customers without them knowing the latest ruling of the FCC, but also says there is no immediate regulatory need for operators to upgrade their legacy C91a ELTs to the more modern C126 ELTs. However, for safety reasons, the AEA encourages pilots to upgrade to the C126 ELT. Those operating with legacy C91a ELTs should be aware that the usefulness of the units is very limited, as the justification for the FCC ruling indicates, and they most likely will not provide the search-and-rescue capabilities that might be expected.

The Aircraft Electronics Association said that, “The AEA was made aware of this issue only today (June 21, 2010), and has begun working with the FAA, FCC and other associations to allow for a timely transition to this new FCC prohibition without grounding thousands of general aviation aircraft. At this time, the AEA recommends members delay selling any new 121.5 MHz ELTs until further understanding of this new prohibition can be understood and a realistic timeline for transition can be established.”

To download the FCC’s order, click here.

Operators will have two options for equipage under this rule: the 1090 megahertz (MHz) extended squitter (ES) broadcast link or the Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) broadcast link. Generally, this equipment will be required for aircraft operating in Classes A, B and C airspace, certain Class E airspace and other airspace as specified.

This final rule requires aircraft flying at and above 18,000 feet mean sea level (MSL) Class A airspace to have ADS-B Out performance capabilities using the 1090 MHz ES broadcast link. It also specifies that aircraft flying in the designated airspace below 18,000 feet MSL may use either the 1090 MHz ES or UAT broadcast link.

The rule prescribes ADS-B Out performance requirements for all aircraft operating in Class A, B and C airspace within the NAS; above the ceiling and within the lateral boundaries of a Class B or Class C airspace area up to 10,000 feet MSL; and Class E airspace areas at or above 10,000 feet MSL over the 48 contiguous United States and the District of Columbia, excluding the airspace at and below 2500 feet above the surface.

Aircraft must meet these performance requirements in the airspace within 30 nautical miles of certain identified airports that are among the nation’s busiest (based on annual passenger enplanements, annual airport operations count and operational complexity) from the surface up to 10,000 feet MSL. Also, aircraft must meet ADS-B Out performance requirements to operate in Class E airspace over the Gulf of Mexico at and above 3000 feet MSL within 12 n.m. of the coastline of the U.S.

The AEA says it is cautiously optimistic that the FAA has finalized a reasonable rule. The next step in the process will be to review the installation requirements to be published in the near future as an Advisory Circular.

You can read the complete Federal Register document here.

Photo courtesy FlightAware.com.

In the specialist press, the pilot was celebrated for keeping the airplane under control and putting the Lancair onto the Hilton Head beach instead of into a parking lot—potentially injuring many more souls—or into the ocean, which might have had dire consequences for him and his passenger. We pilots realized just how challenging such a situation can be: little to no forward visibility in an airplane that descends quickly and lands fast, and no power at all to help moderate the descent.

It was a different story in the mainstream press, whose merchants of hipshot derided the pilot for not seeing the runner and for callously choosing this stretch of beach, which, according to reports, was not at all crowded. His desire to save his airplane overrode what should have been a greater desire to spare the lives of others, or so you’d think from reading the general-media accounts. And in the stories I’ve read where reader feedback was supported, there were many examples of general outrage. Again, the pilot should have put the airplane into the ocean, and, so it would seem, sacrifice his own and his passenger’s life to avoid what can only be considered a freak occurrence.

Reporters look for sources and found one ready made in Mary Schiavo, former inspector general of the National Transportation Safety Board. She is reported to have commented that “even with oil smeared on the windshield…[the pilot] should have been able to see through a small window on the side of the plane and possibly yell out to anyone below.” If only the pressurized Lancair had one…

After the shock of an airplane hitting an innocent jogger began to subside, the usual questions about safety began to percolate to the surface. Let’s put something to rest right away: As far as I can discern, the engine and prop on the accident airplane were certified items. What appears to have been a crankshaft failure might well have happened, and indeed has happened, to a Piper Malibu. Without more information, it’s difficult to separate the engine failure from the fact that it happened to be in an Experimental/Amateur-Built aircraft, but that’s too fine a distinction for the general media.

Instead, the press began looking for sources to understand the homebuilt safety record. Unfortunately, it found the recently published Nall Report, put out by the AOPA Air Safety Foundation based on NTSB data. In fairly a churlish tone, the Nall Report says:

Amateur-built aircraft continued to suffer dramatically higher accident rates than type-certificated aircraft due, in part, to greater numbers of mechanical failures and unexplained losses of engine power.

In 2008, 228 amateur-built fixed-wing aircraft were involved in 226 distinct accidents, the same numbers as in 2007… This represents 18% of all non-commercial fixed-wing accident aircraft, the highest proportion in the past ten years, during which time that proportion has steadily increased. Sixty-one of these were fatal, resulting in 82 deaths; these were increases of six fatal accidents and nine fatalities from the previous year, and made up 26% of fatal accidents and 19% of all fatalities. By comparison, amateur-built aircraft logged less than 5% of the corresponding flight time. 2008 saw the highest numbers of fatal accidents and individual fatalities in the past decade, and more total accidents than any year except 2007. The 27% lethality rate in these accidents was 10 full percentage points higher than that for accidents in type-certificated airplanes.

Fairly sobering numbers—if they’re correct.

Turns out they’re not. I spent a few hours with the raw data and by simply recognizing which aircraft were not actually Experimental/Amateur-Built designs, found that the true count was 53 fatal accidents taking 72 lives. Now, that’s still more than any of us would like it to be, but the point is that the NTSB records are rife with errors. Some aircraft listed as homebuilts, in fact weren’t: There was a Kaman helicopter and a Laird biplane in the mix. What’s more, the recent changes in registration rules for ultralights have added a number of designs now called ELSAs that were lumped in with homebuilts, further skewing the data. There were basic arithmetic errors, crediting one accident involving two aircraft and three fatalities as having three deaths each. In truth, sloppy record keeping isn’t new, but the fact is that this latest round of reports has caused this shabby data set to be used against us.

Aviation writer and statistic keeper Ron Wanttaja found similar errors over the years and additional errors in the 2008 data; his detailed look at the data reduced the total number of accidents for homebuilts to 185, a deletion of 84 accidents that did not involve homebuilts. What’s more, Wanttaja advocates counting accidents against fleet size instead of the more popular hours-flown denominator because this is a figure more easily discerned. In his analysis, the original accident rate by fleet size as published in the Nall Report was 0.86% in 2008, while the much more accurate assessment has the number at 0.59%. The result is that the homebuilt rate by fleet size is just less than 20% higher than for certified aircraft, rather than the 72% higher as claimed by the Nall Report.

Trying to determine an accident rate per hours flown is complicated by the error-ridden accident data on one side of the equation and the nature of hours-flown data collection, which is a combination of voluntary pilot surveys and educated guesswork on the other. Moreover, it’s common to see data sets that contradict. The FAA data used in the Nall Report implies that fewer homebuilts were flying in 2008 as part of an overall slowing of the GA fleet’s hours-flown figure. This in turn raises  the accident rate for a given number of accidents. But the agency’s own outlook shows Experimental/Amateur-Built aircraft as one of the very few segments expected to grow in the next 10 to 15 years, and it’s my perception that the activity level of homebuilts is at least steady with regard to the rest of the fleet. (I’ll confess this is a purely unscientific survey, so I won’t put hard numbers to it.)

So the most recent event has the FAA publishing an “InFO” Information for Operators document citing “Safety concerns of amateur-built experimental Lancair and other amateur built airplanes possessing high wing loading and stall speeds in excess of 61 knots…” Dated March 9, the report was not released until the third week in March. The report goes on to say that, “FAA analysis of fatal accidents for airplanes operating under an experimental airworthiness certificates, such as the Lancair, has revealed a large and disproportionate number of fatal accidents for their fleet size. Though the FAA has seen a recent downward trend, these aircraft types have experienced fatal accident rates substantially higher than for-personal-use general aviation and the overall fatal accident rate for all amateur-built experimental aircraft.” Hold on. Didn’t the NTSB and AOPA just say the homebuilt fatality rate was up? And just what defines “a large and disproportionate number of fatal accidents”? Can we have some accurate data, placed in context, please? We need more than a vague sensation that something’s amiss, and, before making recommendations, understand the root causes of the accidents that form this impression. Wing loading and stall speeds are easy targets because they’re lines on the spec sheet, but the truth is more subtle. Fast airplanes can be safe, and even slow-stalling aircraft with low wing loading can be a handful. (Early experience with SLSAs demonstrated that a pilot with 2000 hours in a Bonanza might not safely transition into an LSA without explicit instruction.)

In addition, it sure seems as though Lancair is getting to ride the barrel down the falls here. There are other designs with high wing loading and with stall speeds at or above 61 knots but only Lancair was specifically referred to. Could it be that the Lancairs are the most visible examples?

In the InFO document, the FAA made several recommendations. Among them, installation of angle-of-attack devices or stall warnings; use of mechanics with specific-model experience to evaluate rigging, wing alignment and weight and balance; evaluation by a qualified test pilot for handling qualities, particularly after aerodynamic modifications are performed; and specific training for the pilot. At least in the Lancair world, most of these recommendations are already being followed—there are effective, demanding training programs for the Lancair IV to ensure pilots are comfortable with the airplane’s handling qualities and required airspeeds.

If the past is prologue, my worry is that the next act will be a move by the FAA to set standards for Experimental/Amateur-Built aircraft for specs such as maximum wing loading and stall speeds. We enjoy incredible freedom in this area, but the chain of events strikes me as table setting for regulations that, for the first time, would impede the ability of designers and experimenters to pursue new technologies and aerodynamics. And we all know that once a few regulations are imposed, follow-ons come much more easily. What might be next? Demand certified engines and props? TSO-approved avionics? (Ironically, there’s a good chance the Lancair at the start of this story had all of the above.)

I  hope the Experimental Aircraft Association will begin to make more noise on this front, certainly much more than the meekly worded rebuttal to the Nall Report’s use of suspect NTSB data and acknowledgment of the FAA InFO letter. I don’t doubt there are politics in the background, but, personally, I feel under-represented.

This is a line-in-the-sand moment.

If the FAA is intent on forcing rules through in the guise of improving safety, it’s critical that we all call attention to sloppy, biased reporting and accident data riddled with errors before it constitutes the rationale for revised policy or increased regulation.

On that note, we’ve decided to do something about this dissemination of bad data. Starting in the July issue of KITPLANES and thanks to the considerable efforts of Ron Wanttaja, we’ll begin looking into certain aircraft types and the accidents common to them. First, we’ll examine the two-seat Van’s RV series, and then have a detailed review of the Lancair accidents in the August issue. It’s my hope that proper and accurate accident analysis will reveal that our sport can mix freedom of design and execution, and safety. I suspect that once we’ve stripped away the stupid pilot tricks and ill-considered modifications to established kits, the accident picture of homebuilts and store-bought airplanes will be remarkably similar.

***

The “Community Airport Access and Protection Act of 2010” was introduced yesterday to Congress by the Honorable Sam Graves (R MO) and Honorable Leonard Boswell (R IA) to correct the FAA’s recent policy to prohibit “through the fence” access at any airport receiving Airport Improvement Grant monies. Senator James Inhofe (R OK) has introduced a similar bill on the Senate side.

The FAA prohibited “through the fence” (TTF) access in its Airport Compliance Manual Order 5190.6b which was released September 30, 2009, without any public or alphabet group input.  In addition, a Freedom of Information Act request made by the aviation group ThroughTheFence.org revealed that essentially no data, studies, or non FAA personnel’s opinion went into the new order.

The Bill essentially allows off-airport “through the fence” access and prevents the FAA from considering an airport to be in violation of their grant assurances due to such access agreements.  The legislation does require the off airport users to pay access charges similar to “on airport” tenants and maintain their properties compatible with safe airport functions.

“Congressmen Graves and Boswell as well as Senator Inhofe deserve tremendous credit for sponsoring legislation which insures access to general aviation airports and supports their economic vitality through TTF fees” stated Brent Blue, coordinator of ThroughTheFence.org.  “This correction of FAA policy will help maintain the viability of small airports by encourage use while supporting safety and security” Blue continued.

ThroughTheFence.org is encouraging all pilots and others interested in general aviation to contact their Senators and Representatives to support this important legislation for airports.

For Further Information:
www.throughthefence.org
Brent Blue
307-220-2543

New certificates can be applied for via U.S. mail by completing an Application for Replacement of Lost, Destroyed, or Paper Airman Certificate, available from the FAA. Or you can send a letter that includes your name, date and place of birth, social security number and/or certificate number and stating why you need a replacment to: FAA Airmen Certification Branch, AFS-760 P.O. Box 25082, Oklahoma City, OK 73125-0082. Include a check or money order for $2 (per certificate requested), payable to the FAA.

A request for a new Airman Certificate can also be made online by visiting the FAA web site. A downloadable PDF of the application is also available there.

On Saturday November 7, the FAA published a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin warning pilots and builders of CH601XL and CH650 aircraft to look for and adhere to a Zenith safety directive that should be published shortly. The FAA cited the inflight breakup record of this aircraft series, both as SLSA and Experimental/Amateur-Built models, in publishing the SAIB. The agency is recommending owners comply with the upcoming guidance before further flight.

In the SAIB, the FAA cited “several areas of concern regarding the CH601XL design that may impact the overall safety of the design.” Among those areas:

· Wing structure: FAA analysis shows bending loads used to design the wing structure were non-conservative and the basic static strength of the CH601XL/CH650 does not appear to meet the intent of the ASTM standards for a 600kg (1320 lb) airplane, given the current flight envelope in the Pilot Operating Handbook.

· Structural Stability: Other aviation authorities have noted the presence of buckling in the wing structure, including in the center section. Such structural instabilities can have a significant effect on static strength and flutter characteristics.

· Flutter: Our detailed review of available flutter analysis reports was inconclusive. However, accident photos clearly indicated flutter was present during the in-flight structural failures. The FAA believes flutter may either be a first order root cause of in-flight structural failure or a secondary cause after some initial wing structural deformation or twisting.

· Airspeed calibration: Calibration procedures do not appear to adequately account for basic static pressure source error due to the location of the static port. This could lead to potential airspeed indication anomalies, particularly since the CH601XL/650 derivatives can be delivered/built with several different airspeed indicators installed or without an indicator at all. The situation could lead to the potential of operating the airplane above the maneuver speed and/or the design cruise speed, potentially leading to structural failure.

· Stick force characteristics: Flight test data from foreign authorities indicates at aft center of gravity the stick forces become very light. The FAA believes this may be a contributing factor in structural failure accidents if coupled with operations over gross weight, at speeds higher than VA, and/or for aircraft loaded improperly. In such conditions, it would be very easy to dynamically load the CH601XL/CH650 wing beyond its design structural load limit.

Zenith is expected to publish its recommendations soon. They follow a series of communication with builders and pilots, including a letter from designer Chris Heintz in July that recommended all aircraft should comply with all service letters published by the company; ensuring that all CH 601XL and CH 650 aircraft have a current weight and balance; reduce aircraft Vne to 140 mph; and reduce maximum gross weight to 1255 pounds (from 1320). This letter also outlined methods of inspecting the design’s aileron control system for freeplay and cable tension.

The FAA’s SAIB can be found here.

Zenith’s letter can be found here.

The good news for builders is that the basic revisions to the AC appear as predicted in the months since Oshkosh, when we were told that some onerous aspects of the proposed new rules—such as the dreaded 20/20/11 rule, requiring 20% fabrication by the builder—have been dropped. In addition, the new AC has a more comprehensive and rational definition of fabrication than the one floated by the FAA in the summer of 2008.

In the AC, the FAA has established criteria by which builders can determine which set of rules apply to them. If the kit itself was evaluated before the rules change (and found to provide the builder 51% or more of the work to do), the kit itself has not changed since the approval, AND the builder has used no commercial assistance, then he can use the previous rules and checklists. If the kit has been changed or the builder used commercial assistance, then the new rules apply.

Among the additions to the AC is the requirement to document the use of commercial assistance. The AC says, “You must submit a notarized Form 8130-12, certifying the major portion was fabricated and assembled for your own education or recreation. This form also requires a builder to identify if and how much commercial builder assistance was used in the construction of the aircraft and to identify the source of the assistance. Evidence and records need to be available to support these statements and be provided to the FAA upon request.”

An area of concern in the originally proposed changes centered on a fabrication and assembly checklist that was not finely divided to give the builder proper credit for fabrication—if the kit maker or outside assistance completed ANY part of the line item, the builder wouldn’t get any credit. The new task list allows the builder to accept partial credit for partial work completed. At the end of the nine-page list, the builder is to total up the “points” allotted to the kit maker, himself (as both assembly and fabrication) and commercial assistance. The total percentage for builder fabrication and assembly must be 51% or more.

Overall, the industry is breathing a sigh of relief that the final document mirrors what was expected from the agency, and the general feeling is that the new rules will not adversely impact legitimate builders but will, perhaps, put a tourniquet on some of the more outrageous “hired gun” programs we’ve seen.

To obtain a copy of the Advisory Circular, visit the FAA’s web site.

In short, the dreaded 20/20/11 requirement could well be gone—the FAA said last year that it wanted the builder to perform 20% fabrication, 20% assembly (and 11% as either) to add up the “majority” of the work. Builders decried the proposal, calling it unworkable and an unnecessary complication. However, until the final Advisory Circular has been published, we won’t know if this proposal has truly been taken back. The document published today says only that “after much deliberation among ARC members, AIR-200 [the FAA] agreed to consider withdrawal of the 20/20/11 proposal.”

As we reported in August, the definition of fabrication has been broadened to the point that it should be useful in the context of modern kits. In addition, a single group of inspectors will be assigned the task of vetting new kits; this NKET (National Kit Evaluation Team) will be responsible for validating new kits and verifying that the manufacturers sell kits with a “majority” of the work to be done by the builder.

Other highlights:

Read the FAA’s draft here.

Read EAA’s Initial Overview of the policy here.